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Between 1082 and 1192 several Byzantine emperors conferred 
extensive privileges on the three main Italian maritime powers, Venice, 
Pisa and Genoa1 • The charters they issued contained sorne provisions in 
favor of these city-states as collective bodies and others bearing on the 
latter's citizens as individuals and directly affecting their economic activity. 
These charters have been repeatedly examined. Nevertheless, a new reading 
of their commercial and fiscal provisions in a contemporary context and in 
a comparative framework is warranted. It reveals sorne misunderstood or 
overlooked aspects of their content, suggests novel interpretations, and 
sheds light on sorne of their effects on trade, shipping and the Italian settle­
ment pattern in the Empire before the Fourth Crusade2 • 
The first part of our examination is devoted to the nature and extent 
of the commercial and fiscal concessions made by the Empire to the Italian 
maritime powers. Venice was the first to benefit from them3• In 1082 Ale-
11 have recently dealt elsewhcre with thc chrysobull of 992 in favor of Vcnice. See the
emendations of ita text and the detailed discussion in my review of Marco POZZA e Giorgio 
RAVEONANI (cds.), l trattati con Bisanzio, 992-1198 (Pacta vencta, 4 ), Venezia, 1993, 
publishcd in «Meditcrrancan Historical Rcvicw», IX (1994), pp. 140•142. 
2The preaent study is limited to these topics and doca not aim at a comprchcnsivc 
treatment of the privileges, nor of their ovcrall 1mpact. 
30. L. Fr. TAFEL und G. M. THOMAS (eds.), Urlamden zur lJlteren Handels- und
Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, Wien, 1856-1857, 1, pp. 51-54 (heiufter: 1TH); new 
ed. POZZA-RAVEONANl, l trattati con Bi.sanzio, pp. 35-45. Quotations from chartcrs in favor 
of Venice appcaring below are from this edition. On that of 1082, see Ralph-Johannes LIUE, 
11 Anuario de Eatudi• Modievalea•, 24 (1994) 
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xios I Komnenos granted the Venetians freedom of trade in all commodities 
and total exemption from commercial dues, toll payments and port duties 
throughout the Empire. The most important among these payments was the 
kommerkion, a customs duty and sales tax amounting to ten percent of the 
value of the merchandise. No less important was the implicit lifting of the 
time limitation of three months residence, previously imposed upon the 
Venetians and other foreigners4 • In addition, the emperor freed the Vene­
tians from the authority of several state officials, among them the kommer­
kiarioi or customs agents, in charge of levying the kommerkiorr. The lo­
gothetos of the dromos, responsible since 992 for the inspection of Vene­
tian ships and for the collection of the taxes they owed6, is not mentioned 
in this context. lt is likely, therefore, that this officer retained sorne of his 
former functions with respect to the Venetians, an assumption apparently 
supported by a clause in the charter which Alexios 111 Komnenos issued in 
their favor in 11987• In any event, it is clear, that Byzantine officers conti­
nued to exercise sorne form of control over Venetian merchants and chec­
ked their identity in order to ensure that they only, and not others, benefit 
from the privileges bestowed u pon them8• This supervision is confirmed by 
the taxing of the Venetians' trade partners before 11269, which supposes 
that Byzantine officers were either present when transactions were carried 
out or were informed about them by mesites or official middlemen. In 
short, Anna Comnena's claim that the Venetians could "trade without 
Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen 
Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081-1204), 
Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 8-16, and Silvano BORSARJ, Venezia e Bisanzio ne/ XII secolo. I
rapporti economici, Venezia, 1988, pp. 3-16. 
"Robert S. LÓPEZ, Sil/e lndustry in the Byzantine Empire, «Speculum•, XX (1945), pp. 27-
28, 40, repr. in IDEM, Byzantium and the World around it: Economic and Jnslitutional 
Relations, London, 1978, no. 111. 
5On these offices, see Hélene AHRWEILER, Fonctionnaires et bureau.x maritimes, «Rcvuc
des étudee byzantincs•, XIX (1961), pp. 246-252; Nicolas OIK0N0MIDES, Les listes de 
préséance byzantines des IX! et ¡(' siecles. lntroduction, texte, traducrion et commentaire, 
Paris, 1972, pp. 311-313, 319-321, with references to earlier studics. 
6New cd. P0ZZA-RAVEGNANI, l trattati con Bisanzio, p. 24. 
7He appears as cancellarius vie in 1TH, I, pp. 273-274 (misdated); ncw cd. P0ZZA­
RAVE0NANI, / trattati con Bisando, pp. 132-133. 
'Thc regular inspection by the lcommerkiarioi was later cxplicitely mentioned in the 
By1J1ntine-Vcnctian trcaty of 1265: 1TH, III, p. 84. 
9Sce below. 
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interference as they wished" and "were completely free of Roman autho­
rity" should not be taken at face value 1º . The wide-ranging concessions 
of 1082 to the Venetians, never befare granted to foreigners, constituted a 
first and significant breach in the tight Byzantine economic and fiscal sy­
stem and in the state's supervision over the activity of foreigners in the 
Empire. They served as a precedent on which Venice itself, as well as Pisa 
and Genoa later relied when requesting commercial and fiscal privileges. 
The clauses in the charter of 1082 dealing with trade throughout the 
Empire contain a list of thirty cities and two islands, Corfu and Chios. 
Opinions differ as to the nature of this enumeration, its implications, and 
the side responsible for its inclusion. It is commonly believed that it had a 
restrictive character, denying the Venetians tax exemptions in places omit­
ted from the list, such as Crete, Cyprus and the Black Sea. It has even 
been suggested that the emperor intended to prevent their access to these 
localities and regions11 • The charter issued by John II in 1126, which 
reproduces the Iist of 1082, appears at first glance to support these restricti­
ve interpretations 12• It has airead y been noted, however, that the Vene­
tians traded somewhat later in places omitted from the list, namely Crete 
and Halmyros, where one of them even resided in 112913 • This would 
imply that the Venetians were not excluded from these places, nor from
any part of the Empire, and traded in them without enjoying their tax
exemptions. Yet it should be stressed that both the charters of 1082 and
1126 emphatically state that the Venetians were to enjoy their commercial
and fiscal privileges in ali the territories of the Empire or Romanía and in
ali the localities in which trade was conducted, "in omnes partes Romanie,
et simpliciter in omnes partes sub potestate nostre pie mansuetudinis, in
omnibus negotiationis loe is". It is noteworthy that the imperial charter
granted to Pisa in 1111 also included commercial and fiscal provisions that
1ºAnnc Comnenc, Alexiad�, ed. Bemard LFJB, Paria, 1945, lib. VI, 10 
1
1Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 50-61; Silvano BORSARI, Venezia e
Bisanzio, pp. 8-9, 19-20. 
121TH, 1, pp. 95-98; new ed. POZZA-RAVEGNANI, / trattali con Bisanzio, pp. 51-56: 
habeant ipsi sine prohibilione et negotiari sine commercio et datione qualicumque altera in 
omnibus dinu�ratis in pre/ato chrysobullio civitatibus et regionis. 
13Cretc: Raimondo MOROZZO DEllA ROCCA - Antonino LOMBARDO (eds.), Documenti del 
commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, Torino, 1940 (hereafter: DCV), nos. 33, 56 (1111 
and 1130); Halmyros, nos. 34-35, 54 (1111 and 1129). 
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were to be valid throughout the Empire, without any geographic limita­
tion 14. It is most unlikely that Venice, which enjoyed a larger tax exemp­
tion than Pisa, would have agreed to such a limitation when its privileges 
were renewed in 1126. Under these circumstances, we have to find another 
explanation for the inclusion of the list of cities and islands and the omis­
sions from it, more convincing than the one offered until now. 
I would suggest that the Venetians themselves requested an explicit 
reference to localities and islands in which they already conducted fairly 
extensive trade, as in Thebes and Dyrrachion or Durazzo, about which we 
have clear evidence, or to which they were hoping to extend their activity 
in the near future15• With the exception of Adrianople, ali these places 
were either situated along the coast or close to it, such as Thebes and 
Antioch. It is noteworthy that their enumeration follows the course of 
navigation toward Constantinople, in the east from Laodikeia to Phokaia or 
Phocea along the seaboard of Northern Syria and Asia Minor, and in the 
west from Dyrrachion, the first Byzantine station encountered by the Vene­
tians in the Adriatic, along the coast of the Peloponnese. Toe list thus 
reflects the perspective of sailors and merchants, based on practica} expe­
rience, rather than the view of Byzantine state officials stationed in the 
capital. It is generally assumed that, in view of their location, both Crete 
and Cyprus were important strategic bases along the main waterways of the 
Eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the eleventh century16 • This view, 
however, is not supported by contemporary sources and reflects an unwa­
rranted hackward projection of conditions existing only much later. In any
event, from a Byzantine perspective these islands were then of minor strate­
gic, commercial and fiscal importance, compared with other places and
14See bclow. 
is-rhc laxegium de Stives is mentioned both in 1072, with implicit reference to the previous 
ycar, and 1073, which suggcsts regular voyages to Thebcs: DCV, nos. 12-13. See also David 
JACOBY, Silk in We .. ftem Byzanlium before the Fourth Crusade, «By1..antinische Zeitschrift», 
84/85 (1991-1992), pp. 494-496. Thc earliest extant evidcncc about Venetian tradc in Antioch 
is dated 1095, after its capture by the Muslims: DCV, no. 24. On Dyrrachion, see Alain 
DUCEUJER, LA fafade maritime de l 'Albanie au Moyen Age. Durau.o et Valona du Xle au 
XVe sitcle, Thessaloniki, 1981, pp. 70-72, yct instead of 1084 read 1082. 
16Ralph-Johannes LlllE, Handel und Polilik, pp. 56, 121-122; Silvano BokSARI, Venezia e 
Bisanzio, pp. 19-20; Elisabcth MAI.ANUT, Les íles de l'Empire byzantin, V/le -X/le sitcles, 
París, 1988, pp. 440-446; John H. PRYOR, Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the 
Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571, Cambridge, 1988, passim, esp. 25-39, 87-
101, l 12-134. 
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regions in the Empire in which the Venetians were granted the benefit of 
. their privileges. We may safely discount, therefore, a supposed Byzantine 
reluctance to enable Venetian trade in Crete and Cyprus because of strate­
gic considerations or because of the severe losses in fiscal revenue the 
imperial treasury would have incurred. 
Indeed, there is no evidence that ships engaging in long-distance 
trans-Mediterranean trade regularly called in the ports of Crete and Cyprus 
or sailed along their coasts at that time. Navigational considerations indu­
ced them to hug the seabord of the Peloponnese on their way between 
Venice and Constantinople, while those connecting Venice and Alexandria 
relied on a string of Aegean islands to sail between the Peloponnese and 
Asia Minor and proceeded along the Levantine coast. Crete and Cyprus 
were left out from these itineraries. Significantly, the Venetian war fleet 
operating in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1122 to 1125, which was not 
involved in maritime trade, sailed between Venice and the Levant along 
what must have been the regular maritime route from Venice vía Corfu and 
the Aegean to Rhodes, and other western tleets followed the same route in 
subsequent years. Largely similar conditions still prevailed with respect to 
Crete in the first decades of the twelfth century, despite an apparent increa­
se in Venetian trade in the island in the years preceding the delivery of the 
new imperial charter of 1126 17 • 
Nor was Cyprus located along a majar waterway or serving as an 
indispensable stopover for long-distance trade. Venetian interest in it was 
slow to develop after the First Crusade. The privileged Venetian outposts 
established along the seaboard of the Crusader Levant between 1098 and 
1124 were closer to Muslim inland markets and offered more secure and 
favorable conditions for seaborne trade and logistic support than Byzantine 
Cyprus. Even after the Latín conquest of 1191 Cyprus continued for many 
years to fulfill a marginal economic function within long-distance Medite­
rranean commerce18• On the other hand, it was integrated together with 
the Crusader Levant and Egypt in a triangular regional trade pattern, as 
17See David JACOBY, Byzantine Crete in the Navigation and Trade Networks of Venice and 
Genoa, in Laura BALLETTO (ed.), "Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino", Genova, 1995 (in press). 
18Sce David JACOBY, The Rise of a New Emporium in the Eastem Mediterranean: Fama­
gusta in the l.Ate Thirteenth Century, «Mcletai k.ai hypomnemata, Hidryma archiepiskopou 
Malcariou III (Nicosia)», 1 (1984), pp. 145-179, esp. 145-154, repr. in IDEM, Studies on the 
Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion, Northampton, 1989, no. VIII. 
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attested in 1139 by the sailing of a Venetian ship between Limassol and 
Damietta and a trade investment in Sarracen bezants, struck in the Crusader 
states19 • Toe journey between Acre and Constantinople via Cyprus may 
have become more common by 114220 • Not until sometime before 1173,
though, do we find a Venetian settled in the island, namely at Paphos21•
Sorne Venetians may have been among the Latins, presumably merchants, 
who resided at Limassol when the Latins conquered Cyprus in 119122 • 
In short, in 1082 Venetian trade with both Crete and Cyprus was of 
marginal importance and the prospects of its development were rather 
limited, compared with Venetian activity and expectations in the localities 
and regions listed in the chrysobull of Alexios l. Conditions had not basi­
cally changed by 1126, both islands being still positioned on alternative, 
yet not on main navigation routes. As a result, it was Venice which appa­
rently refrained from demanding their inclusion in the charters of 1082 and 
1126. Toe same holds true of Rhodes, which well into the twelfth century 
was apparently no more than a stopover for Venetian ships on the way to 
and from the Levant and does not appear before 1198 in an imperial char­
ter in favor of Venice23 • In these islands Venetian merchants were ne­
vertheless entitled to their tax exemptions, as elsewhere in the Empir�.
Toe chrysobull issued by John II in 1126 reveals that the imperial 
officers were levying the full amount of the kommerldon from Byzantine 
subjects and foreigners trading with the Venetians, in order to compensate 
the imperial treasury for the loss of revenue resulting from the latter's 
exemption. This practice had been common for many years, which suggests 
that its implementation had begun before 1118, when John II ascended the 
throne, and was not related to the emperor's refusal to renew the Venetian 
19DCV, no. 74. 
MDCV, no. 82, draftcd in January 1143, with rcfercnce. to a atopover in Paphoa. 
21DCV, nos. 454-455, not in 1201, u mi&takcnly stated in David JACOBY, Th� lti16 of a
New Emporium, pp. 164-165; also DCV, no. 373, on trade bctwecn Tyrc and Cyprua 10mc 
time beforc 1189. 
22Oeorge HIIL, A History of Cyprus, Cambridge, 1940-19S2, I, p. 318.
23Seo Ralph-Johannea LIUE, Handel und Politilc, pp. 124-125; TIH, I, p. 265 (miadatcd);
new cd. PoZZA-RAVEONANI, / tranati con Bisanzio, p. 130. 
2AThe omi&1ion of t.he Black Sea from the charters of 1082 and 1126 wu apparently 
rclatcd to Venctian reluctance to engagc in trade in thia rcgion for economic reuona. The 
isaue ia not diacussed hcre for lack of space and will be examined aeparatcly in a forthcoming 
atudy. 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://estudiosmedievales.revistas.csic.es
1T ALIAN PRIVILEOES ANO TRADE IN BYZANTIUM 355 
privileges in the first eight years of bis reign. Nor was it due to the private 
initiative of some imperial officers. Rather, it seems to have been devised 
and ordered by a high-ranking authority, as implied by the wording of the 
clause dealing with its abolition in John's charter of 1126, which refers to 
a capitulum, apparently an official decree�. 
About 1136 Venice requested Emperor John II to enjoin bis officers 
to ensure Venetian freedom of trade and full tax exemptions in Crete and 
Cyprus, as well as for goods exported from these islands to other parts of 
the Empire26• This too has been interpreted as proof that until then the 
Venetians were denied the benefit of these privileges in the two islands. 
Yet following my argument that the lists of 1082 and 1126 were not res­
trictive, another explanation may be suggested. Ample evidence adduced 
below clearly demonstrates that there often was a wide gap between the 
wording, meaning and intention of imperial privileges or orders and their 
interpretation and implementation in the field, despite the centralized struc­
ture of the Byzantine state. It is highly probable, then, that while the privi­
leges of 1082 and 1126 were meant to be comprehensive by the Byzantine 
and Venetian negotiators, the imperial customs officers stationed in the 
provinces considered them selective. As a result, they may have inflicted 
more hardship upon the Venetians in Crete and Cyprus than elsewhere in 
the Empire, since the two islands were not explicitely mentioned in the 
chrysobulls issued in these years. However, the main factor accounting for 
Venice's request of about 1136 was the growing volume of Venetian trade 
in Crete and Cyprus. In 1147, at Venice's insistence, Manuel I explicitly 
referred to the injunction of his father John II when he reconfirmed the 
privileges of 1082 and 1126. It should be noted, though, that even then 
John's orders issued sorne eleven years earlier were not properly imple­
mented and, as a result Venetian trade in the islands was still being hampe-
2-TfH, 1, p. 97; new ed. POZZA-RAV&JNANI, I trattali con Bi.sanzio, pp. 54-SS: quatenus 
corrigetur huiusmodi quoque capitulum. For another inatance of official rc■triction of free 
trade, see below. 
1'Thia is rcported in thc chartcr iasued by Manuel I: ITH, 1, pp. 113-124, cap. 124; ncw
cd. POZZA-RAVEONANI, / traltati con Bisan.zio, pp. 60-65, cap. 63-64: licentiam his donans
improhibite et per insulas Cypron et Creten negotiari et siM commercio ubique terrarum
imperii mei pro his, qu11 ab huiusmodi insulis negociande sunt ab eis. Another, later Latin
venion i1 more flucnt: ibid. Por the presumed dating of the empcror'a instructiona, ace Ralph­
Johannea LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 374-375.
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red27 • This suggests once more that the unfavorable trade conditions en­
countered by the Venetians in Crete and Cyprus until about 1136, as well
as between this date and 1147, were not related to a supposed exclusion of
these islands from the privileges granted in 1082 and 1126.
On 12 March 1171 all the Venetians present in the Empire were 
either arrested on the orders of Manuel I, or fled28 • Sorne Venetians resu­
med their activity in the Empire a few years later, as in Thebes since 1175 
and Constantinople in 1176, if not earlier, though presumably on a smaller 
scale than before29 • Larger numbers of Venetians re-established themsel­
ves in Constan�inople and in the Empire's provinces since the autumn of 
1183. It would seem that they enjoyed the tax exemptions to which they 
were entitled, although Venice and By2antium did not formally resume 
their formal relations and renew their previous agreements before February 
1187. Venice obtained then compensútions for goods confiscated by the 
imperial authorities or seized by imperial subjects in March 1171, yet there 
was no reference to the kommerkion in this context'°. This is ali the more 
significant because in 1192 both Pisa and Genoa complained about excessi­
ve payments of this due imposed on their citizens in similar circumstan­
ces31. Toe chrysobull of 1198 issued by Alexios III Komnenos did not 
introduce any change with respect to Venetian taxation in the Empire. 
However, it contains a new geographic reference. Instead of enumerating 
cities and islands, as the charters of 1082 and 1126, it contains a list of 
fiscal districts32 • This list, which virtually covers the whole Empire, may 
be safely ascribed to the Byzantine authorities, yet again its insertion in the
imperial charter must have been requested by the Venetians. It reflects both
27ITH, 1, p. 124; new ed. POZZA-RAVEGNANI, l trattati con Bisanzio, pp. 63-64: non 
contigit autem, que in huiusmodi precepto comprehenduntur effectum recipere. 
28See Michacl ANGOlD, The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204. A Political History, London
and New York, 1984, pp. 199-201. 
29Thcbea: David JACOBY, Silk in Western Byt.antium, pp. 495-496; Conatantinople: Luigi 
LANFRANCHI (ed.), S. Giorgio Maggiore (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, 1ez. 11 - Archivi 
ecclesiutici .. Dioccsi Castellana), Vcnezia, 1968, 111, nos. 374-375. 
]()David JACOBY, Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1187-
1192), in Geo PISTARINO (ed.), "Atti del Congresso lntemazionale 'Dai feudi monferrini e dal 
Piemontc ai nuovi mondi oltre gli Oceani'", Alessandria, 1993, p. 221. 
31 See below. 
32TfH, 1, pp. 246-278; new cd. POZZA-RAVEGNANI, l tratatti con Bisanzio, pp. 119-137: 
in quibus mercari debent ordinari. Sec Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 4149, 
62-68.
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://estudiosmedievales.revistas.csic.es
1T ALIAN PRJVILEGES ANO TRADE IN BYZANTIUM 357 
the effective range of Venetian trade in the Empire, which had considerably 
expanded in the course of the twelfth century, and expectations of further 
development. 
Pisa presumably relied on the Venetian privileges of 1082 in its 
negotiations with Alexias 1, yet had to settle for much less. The charter 
issued by this emperor in its favor in 1111, which has survived as an insert 
in the one delivered by Isaac II Angelos in 1192, contains three provisions 
dealing with the kommerldon33 • The Pisans were completely exempted 
from this due on the import of bullion into the Empire, which the emperor 
wanted to further to the benefit of the imperial treasury. Bullion imports 
were anyhow required by the Pisans' negative balance of trade with Byzan­
tium. In addition, the rate of the kom'!'erkion was reduced from ten to four 
percent on the import of other goods brought from foreign countries, which 
the Pisans were allowed to sell or exchange as well as to transfer freely 
between Constantiilople and the Byzantine islands. This geographic referen­
ce was clearly not restrictive. It retlected the actual trade and barter in 
which the Pisans were engaging at that time, both in and between Byzanti­
ne ports, in pa�icular when crossing the Aegean on their way to and from 
Constantinople, the Crusader Levant and Egypt. Although not explicitely 
stated, the Pisans were liable to the full amount of the kommerkion on 
�xports from the Empire. It has not been noted that such was also the case 
with respect to the sale of goods purchased within the Empire itself, prima­
rily domestic products, another field of activity in which the Pisans remai­
ned on the same footing as non-privileged Latins and imperial subjects34. 
S ignificantl y, the chrysobull of 1111 does not contain a reference to free­
dom of trade in ali commodities, as found in the charter of 1082 in favor 
of Venice. This omission may be ascrihed to a major evolution in the By­
zantine attitude and policy toward foreign merchants. Since 1082 the Empi­
re had apparently lifted its previous restrictions on their sojourn and free-
:nGiuseppe MOLLER (ed.), Documenti sulle re/azioni delle cilla toscane coll'Oriente
cristiano e coi Turchi fino all 'anno MDXXXI, Firenzc, 1879, pp. 43-45 (Greek vcrsion) and 
52-54 (Latin version). For typographical reasons I quote here thc Latin version. On this
charter, see Ralph-Johannes LUJE, Handel und Politik, pp. 69-76.
3-iGiuseppe M0UER, Documenti, pp. 44 (Greek) and 53 (Latin): Alias autt'm merces quae 
de Romania sunl vendeti.s sicut Romei et dabitis sicut Romei; a sornewhat different wording 
appears on pp. 46 and 55. Silvano BORSARI, Pisani a Bisanzio nel XII secolo, in "Studi di 
storia pisana e toscana in onore del prof. Cinzio Violante" (Biblioteca del «Bollcttino Storico 
Pisano», Collana storica, XXXVIII), Pisa, 1991, p. 61, is thc only one to have noted this 
restriction, yet does not dwcll on its implications. 
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dom of movement within the Empire and adopted a more liberal stance 
toward them. What had been a novelty in 1082 had become self-evident 
and customary by 1111. Toe majar economic issue at stake at that time 
between the Empire and Pisa was the tax exemptions which the latter re­
quested. 
Both J ohn II in 1136 and Manuel I in 1170 issued charters to Pisa, 
yet without any change in the taxation clauses of 111135• Ten years of 
tension elapsed after the 1182 massacre of the Latins in Constantinople 
until the Empire and Pisa rene.wed their formal relations in February 
119236 • Within the preceding ten years, though, a small number of Pisans
had pursued their commercial activity in the Empire, sorne of them even 
residing there, yet the imperial authorities refused to honor the partial 
exemption of the kommerkion to which they were entitled. In 1192 Pisa 
requested the reimbursement of the excessive payments exacted from 
them37 • It .obtained a marked improvement with respect to the kommer­
kion. lndeed, Isaac II extended the four percent rate, previously limited to 
imported foreign commodities, to ali transactions, whether sales or purcha­
ses, regardless of the nature and origin of the merchandise. In other words, 
for the flrst time the partial tax exemption enjoyed by the Pisans would 
cover both imported and domestic comrnodities traded on the interna) mar­
ket. The reference to Constantinople and ali the imperial territories in this 
context reflects the extension of Pisan activity throughout the Empire38• It 
is likely that it was requested by the Pisans themselves, in order to prevent 
any restrictive interpretation that might arise from the charter of 1111, 
which mentioned the Byzantine capital and the Aegean islands. Though not 
3sFor the first, see Ralph-Johannes LIUE, Byzanz und die Kreuefahrerstaaien. Studien zur 
Politik des byzantinischen Reiches gegenaber den Staaten der Kreuifahrer in Syrien und 
Palilstina bis zu,n vierten Kreuuug (1096-1204), Münchcn, 1981, pp. 106-107. The charter of 
Manuel I appears as an insert in the one of 1192: Giuseppe MOLI...ER, Documenti, pp. 45 
(Greek) and 54 (Latín). See also Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 76-78. 
36Oiuseppe MOlLER, Documenli, pp. 40-49 (Grcck) and 49-58 (Latín). Scc Ralph-Johan­
nes LIUE, Handel und Politik., pp. 79-83. 
s7Giuseppc M0ll.ER, Documenli, pp. 41-42 (Grcek), 50-5 l(Latin). See JACOBY, Conrad,
Marqui, of Montferrat, p. 222. 
•oiuscppc MOl.l.ER, Documenti, pp. 46 (Grcek) and 55 (Latin): "de ccntum quatuor, tam
in magna Urbe, quam in ceteria terria nostrae piac tranquillitatia, non solum de iia quae de 
alicnia partibus ab ip1i1 in Romaniam affcruntur universis men:ihua, vcrum etiam et de iia 
quae de terris Romaniac ab ip1ia emuntur et in magna Urbe vel aliia tcrria Romaniae vendun­
tur ( ... ) et quattuor de centum tantum dare cos iu bet et in mercibua ipaorum quu de Romanía 
equidcm emunt". 
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explicitely stated, Pisan exports remained liable to the full ten percent 
kommerkion. 
Genoa presumably requested in 1155 the extensive commercial and 
fiscal privileges bestowed upon Venice in 1082, as it did shortly after 
March 117139 • However, the relevant provisions in the agreement it con­
cluded in 1155 with the envoy of Manuel I, Demetrios Makrembolites,
were modelled on the Pisan privileges of 111140 • The Genoese chronicler
Caffaro reports the reduction of the kommerkion rate from ten to four 
percent, without specifying in what circumstances it appl ied41 • Yet from 
the Pisan precedent we know that it concerned exclusively imported goods, 
in addition to a total exemption on bullion encouraging Genoese merchants 
to import it42 • Genoa did not take hold of its quarter in Constantinople 
until 1160 and the emperor failed to honor other provisions of thel 155 
treaty43 , yet the fiscal clauses appear to have been fulfilled. In 1175 Ge­
noa explicitely referred to the period preceding and the one following its 
agreement with Demetrios Makrembolites, when it requested compensations 
for losses it had incurred and those of individual Genoese merchants44 • 
These losses included excessive payments of the kommerkion, above the 
reduced four percent rate of 115545 •
It has not been perceived that Manuel I severely curtailed the im­
plementation of this rate in October 1169. Henceforth it was to be valid in 
Constantinople only, yet not for the re-export of unsold imported goods, 
39See bclow.
«>cesare IMPERIAL.E DI SANT' ANGELO(cd.), Codice diplomatico d1lla repubblica di O-nova
dal MCLXIII al MCLXXXX, Roma, 1936-1942 (hcreafter: CDG), 1, pp. 327-330, cap. 328: in
aliqua vero terra i,mperii eius non dabitis commercium maiorem qu,m Pisani nunc {tri]bwmt. 
See Ralph-Johannes LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 84-87. 
41Luigi Tommaso BEL.GRANO e Cesare IMPERIAL.E DI SANT'ANGELO (cds.), Annali genove­
si di Calfaro e de' suoi continualori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIJI, Roma, 1890-1929 (hereafter: 
Annali Genovesi) I, pp. 41-42. 
42CDG, 11, p. 222: a shipment in argento vivo befare 1174.
43Ralph-Johannca LIUE, Handel und Politik, p. 86, n. 6, arguca that thc trcaty waa not
confinncd by thc cmpcror and Michcl BALAR.O, La Romanie glnoise (Xlle - début du XVe
siecle) (Biblioth�ue des Ecolcs fran�aisea d'Ath�ncs et de Rome, CCXXXV), Rome, 1978, 
pp. 23-25, that it waa sirnply not implcmented befare 1160, yet aee bclow. 
44Instructions of Deccmber 1174 to thc Genocse ambaaaador Orimaldi, aubmittcd the
following ycar to the cmpcror: CDG, 11, pp. 206-222, esp. pp. 216-217: a tempore conventio­
nis Macrampoliti infra, ante conventionem DetMtrii.
45CDG, 11, p. 217, note: ultra debitum drictum solutum.
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for which the Genoese would pay the full rate like non-privileged Latins 
and, implicitely, Byzantine subjects. Toe same rule would apply to the 
imported goods they sold in the Empire's provinces46 • Toe emperor also 
introduced a restriction regarding navigation, of which neither Venice nor 
Pisa suffered. Genoese ships were allowed to sail freely in Byzantine wa­
ters, yet not to Rossia and Matracha. Opinions widely differ as to the 
meaning and implications of this restriction, sorne arguing that the two 
names point to cities, while others believe they stand for the Black Sea and 
the Sea of Azov, respectively47 • This last explanation may be discarded. 
Genoa's later request that its ships be allowed to sail to Matracha would 
have been meaningless if Rossia had pointed to the Black Sea, which these 
vessels would have been compelled to cross48 • The basic issue, then, was 
whether or not these ships would be permitted to enter the Black Sea, since 
there was no way to control their course of navigation once they were in 
this region, unless Rossia and Matracha were under Byzantine rule. The 
provision, however, did not amount to a total ban on Genoese sailing into 
the Black Sea. It envisaged imperial permission in specific cases, though 
not a general authorization. Moreover, since the restriction regarded ships 
only, it did not prevent Genoese merchants from venturing into the Black 
Sea on Byzantine or foreign vessels49 • There is no evidence, however, that 
either Genoese vessels or merchants took advantage of these
possibilities50 • In 1170 Manuel I yielded to Genoa's pressure and granted
it a quarter at a favorable location within Constantinople, 51 presumably in
46CDG, 11, pp. 104• 116, esp. 111: "et ut debeant commcrcium dare sic: videlicet in 
Constantinopoli, de centum quattuor, in aliis vero terris Romanie sicut ceteri Latini dant 
commercium"; p. 112: "si autem lanuenses res suas in Constantinopolim introduxerint casque 
vendere non poterint, fiet de rebus eorum sicut consuetudo cst fieri in aliis Latinis <JUÍ dant 
commercium". A somcwhat different wording appcars in the copy of Manuel's charter mserted 
in the one issued by Isaac II in 1192, yet the meaning is the same: ibid., III, p. 61. 
◄7see Michel BALARD, La Romanie génoise, p. 28, n. 44, whosc last rcference regareis 
ships in the service of Manuel I, and not Genoese commercial vessels� Sandra ORIG0NE, 
Bisanzio e Genova, Genova, 1992, p. 75, n. 41, sums up prcvious approachcs without taking 
sides. 
48CDG, 11, p. 115, note. 
◄9cDG, 11, p. 112: nisi forre ah eius imperio hoc juerit eis concessum. The reference is to 
thc naves Januensium appearing al the beginning of this clause, and not to the Genoese them­
selves, while forte hints al exceptional pennits. 
�Ralph-Johannes LUJE, Handel und Politik, pp. 87-100, 481-484, and othcrs havc ovcr­
looked the full implications of thcse clauses. 
51 CDG, 11, pp. 117-121. 
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part as compensation for the restriction of its fiscal privileges in the pre­
vious year. Since the chrysobull of 1170 does not refer to taxation, it is 
obvious that the provisions of 1169 remained in force. This is also sugges­
ted by their insertion in the charter issued by Isaac II in April 119252 •
Genoa attempted to take advantage of the abrupt interruption of 
Venetian trade in the Empire on 12 March 117153• Shortly afterwards, it 
instructed its ambassador Amico de Murta to request from the emperor 
property, privileges and donations similar to those obtained by Venice in 
the past or, if not possible, at least those enjoyed by Pisa. The provision 
concerning trade dues refers to the full tax exemptions enjoyed by the 
Venetians in ali types of transactions throughout the Empire. The exemp­
tion which Genoa requested was to cover not only its citizens, but also the 
residents of its districtum, which extended along the Riviere of the Ponent� 
and the Levante and comprised localities inland either allied to Genoa or 
subjected to its rule54 • Since 1104 Genoa had obtained the inclusion of 
various localities of the districtum, whose inhabitants participated in its 
commercial and maritime expansion overseas, in its treaties with Crusader 
rulers in the Levant, although the districtum as such was not explicitely 
mentioned before 119055• Genoa, however, failed to obtain any of the 
concessions it requested or an improvement in the harsh tax rule introduced 
by Manuel I in 1169. 
We have noted that the 1182 massacre of the Latins in Constantino­
ple did not entirely interrupt Pisan trade in the Empire. The same holds 
true with respect to the activity of Genoese ships and merchants. Sorne of 
them visited Constantinople since 1186, if not earlier, yet trade with the 
Empire remained intermittent until April 1192, when a new Genoese-Byza-
!,'lCDG, 111, pp. 61-62. 
non which sec abovc, n. 28 
�CDG, 11, pp. 114-116, n. 1, esp. 115, note: .. lanucnses vel aliquis de diatrictu corum 
nullum driotum, nullam dacitam vel exacionem ullo modo tribuant et liberam et omnimodam 
habeant facultatem mercandi et utendi per omncm terram et omnea partes imperü et etiam 
exerccndi negociationem pannorum acte apud Stivam sicut Vcncti soliti erant". Theac inatruc­
tiona were ia1ued a.fter the newa of the eventa of March 1171 had rcached Gcnoa: aee W. 
HmNEMBYER, Die Vertr/Jge zwischen de,n OstriJmischen Reiclu und die italischen St/Jdlen 
Genua, Pisa und Venedig vom JO. bis 12. Jahrltundert, «Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgea­
chichte, Sieael- und Wappcnkund�, 111 (1957), p. 109, n. 146. 
ssoavid JACOBY, u, Gfflois dans l 'Emplre by.z,antin: citoydns, sujets et pro1égl1 (1261-
1453), «La Storia dei Gcnoveai,., IX (1989), pp. 246-248 
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ntine agreement was concluded56• In the previous ten years Genoese mer­
chants had endured numerous vexations. Genoa failed to obtain the reim­
bursement of excessive payments of the kommerldon, except for that made 
by Genoa's envoys upon their arrival in Constantinople in the spring of 
1192. Nor was it granted a lowering ofthe due's rate from four to two per­
cent57. On the other hand, the negotiations led to a substantial improve­
ment in its trading conditions. Isaac II extended the four percent rate from 
Constantinople to the Empire's provinces, claiming that this provision 
concurred with the one appearing in the charter issued by Manuel 158 • In 
fact, though, there was a wide gap bet�een the relevant provisions of 1169 
and 1192. The Genoese tax exemptions of 1155 had been based on those 
granted to Pisa in 1111 and shortly after March 1171 Genoa had attempted 
to obtain those enjoyed by Pisa at that time. There is good reason to belie­
ve, therefore, that the laconic statement of April 1192 in favor of Genoa 
regarding the extension of the four percent rate covered the same transac­
tions as those mentioned in the Empire's agreement with Pisa two months 
earlier. In other words, the reduced rate would henceforth apply to the sale 
of imported goods, as well as to ali transactions in internal trade throughout 
the Empire. Exports, though, remained Hable to the ten percent rate. 
A comparison between the commercial and fiscal privileges granted 
by the Empire to the three Italian maritime powers before the Fourth Cru­
sade reveals that Venetian merchants enjoyed a considerable advantage over 
their Pisan and Genoese counterparts. Only they benefited from a full 
exemption of both maritime taxes and the kommerkion, regardless of the 
nature of their transactions. By contrast, the Pisans and the Genoese were 
given such an exemption on bullion only, yet had to pay a four percent 
kommerkion for import and export. Conditions for the Genoese were even 
worse between 1169 and 1192, when this rate was applied to their imported 
goods in Constantinople only. In addition, the Pisans and th_e Genoese paid 
until 1192 the full ten percent kommerldon on trade within the Empire 
itself. This last rule severely restricted their competitiveness on the interna! 
56CDG, 111, pp. 51-62. Sce Ralph-Johannca LIUE, Handel und Polilik, pp. 100-102, 569-
571. For thc ycan 1182-1192, aee David JACOBY, Conrad, Marquis of Montferral, pp. 222-
223 and 237-238, n. 117.
!IICDG, 111, pp. 53-54, 58-59. 
"CDG, 111, p. 58: "iuxta conceaaum illi1 diploma ab ( ... ) Manuclc, 10lvcntc1 quatuor pro 
ccntum intus et extra Conatantinopolim". 
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Byzantine market. Only in 1192 did they obtain the extension of their 
reduced rate to ali types of transactions throughout the Empire, yet still 
suffered from a handicap with respect to the Venetians, who were totally 
exempted. Finally, Genoa was the only one among the three maritime 
powers whose shipping in the black Sea was restricted. 
While the imperial privileges were undoubtedly of great importance 
for the conduct of trade, their effect entirely depended on implementation. 
One point in case is the freedom of trade in ali commodities, from which in 
principie the three maritime powers benefited. In practice, however, they 
were denied trade in certain types of precious silk fabrics produced in 
Thebes, although an explicit reference to this restriction appears neither in 
the charters delivered to them, nor in any other source. Venice gained 
access to these silks by imperial authorization many years before 1171, 
while Genoa made a vain attempt to obtain it from Manuel I shortly after 
this date. The failure to deal in these silks presumably accounts for the 
absence of Genoese and Pisan merchants and settlers from Thebes in the 
twelfth century, by contrast to their Venetian counterparts59 • 
The gap between imperial privileges and reality is also illustrated in 
other ways. It has been rightly observed that it was particularly attractive 
for Byzantine subjects to trade with the Venetians, who could offer higher 
purchase prices without losing their competitive edge over Byzantine or 
other western merchants. Transactions with them were even more advanta­
geous than deals with Byzantines subjects, which entailed the payment of 
full dues60• It was not self-evident, however, that the Venetians could al­
ways translate their sweeping tax exemptions of 1082 into the economic
edge they were originally meant to provide over other merchants. The
imposition of the full kommerkion on the Venetians' trading partners since
sorne time in the reign of Alexios I until 1126 did not contradict the wor­
ding of the exemption clauses of 1082, yet virtua1ly cancelled for many
years any advantage that could have resulted from them. Moreover, Vene­
tian merchants encountered serious difficulties until 1147, if not later,
in obtaining the implementation of their fiscal privileges in Crete and Cy-
"Seo abovc, n. 54, and David JACOBY, Sil/e in Western Byzantium, pp. 466, 490-492. 
80Angoliki E. LAIOU, Byi.antine Traders and Seafarers, in Spero1 VRYONIS, Jr. (cd.), The 
Greeks and IM S•a, New Rochellc, N.Y., 1993, pp. 84-85. 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://estudiosmedievales.revistas.csic.es
364 DA VID JACOBY 
prus61 • Similarly, Pisan and Genoese merchants and ships were sometirnes
denied the benefit of their partial exemption. The imperial customs officers
often displayed excessive zeal, as we learn from the list of grievances
submitted by Genoa in 1175. They arbitrarily imposed excessive dues and
confiscated goods or exacted a second payment of the kommerldon from
transiting merchants, although the due had already been paid at the port of
departure. They even disregarded imperial letters enjoining them to desist
from these practices and make red�ess62 • These impediments to trade seem
to have been a permanent evil throughout the Empire, from which foreign
merchants of ali nations occasionally suffered, at tim� systematically as the
Pisans and the Genoese between 1182 and 119263 • The infringement of
privileges by imperial officers was so common that the Genoese-Byzantine
agreement of 1169 devised a procedure, mentioned again in 1192, for the
handling of Genoese grievances five years later6'.
The absence or non-implementation of privileges did not prevent 
trade and shipping nor entail their interruption. W e have already noted that 
the Venetians engaged in· business in Thebes, Dyrrachium and other locali­
ties before 1082, the Pisans in the Aegean before 1111, and the Genoese in 
Constantinople and Crete before 1155, though without tax exemptions. 
Similarly, some of them pursued their activity in periods of tension bet-
ween their mother-city and the Empire, as the Pisans and the Genoese 
between 1182 and 1192. To be sure, the disparity between the partial tax 
exemptions enjoyed by these two groups and the full ones conferred on the 
Venetians constituted a serious handicap, yet did not prevent continuous 
competition between them. The rivalry was the fiercest in Constantinople, 
where it was fueled by the concentration and intensity of their trade and 
shipping and the existence of their quarters. In 1162 the Venetians joined 
Pisan� and Greeks in the attack on the Genoese, while in 1171 they acted 
on their own against them65 • 
61See above. 
62CDG, 11, pp. 216-219, note; see also above, n. 45. Excessive dues had also bcen paid by
the Venetians befo re 992: see above, n. 1 . 
63See above. 
64CDG, 11, p. 113, and 111, pp. 61-62. 
65Annali Genovesi, I, pp. 67-68, and Michael ANGOW, The Byzantine Empire, p. 200. 
Venetian fear of Pisan compctition appeared in 1100, even before the Pisana had obtaincd 
privileges in the Empire: see Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politik, p. 76, n. 15. 
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The nature and extent of the privileges obtained by the three major 
maritime powers appears to have exercised a far more decisive impact on 
the trade and settlement pattern of their citizens in the Empire's provinces. 
Long-term presence and permanent settlement were clearly related to conti­
nuity in trade in a substantial volume of goods or in the handling of expen­
sive ones. Historical research has focused on long-distance commercial and 
maritime ventures, documented by notarial charters referring to the ultimate 
destinations of merchants and ships. On the other hand, it has largely igno­
red medium and short-distance traffic within the interna} Byzantine trade 
system and failed to recognize its importance for the Italian merchants 
before the Fourth Crusade. Indeed, since the last quarter of the eleventh 
century the Venetians, followed in the twelfth century by their Pisan and 
Genoese counterparts, gradually integrated within the internal trade and 
maritime networks of the Empire. They took advantage of economic oppor­
tunities in ports of call along the shipping lanes connecting Italy to Cons­
tantinople, as well to the Crusader Levant and Egypt, and increasingly 
conveyed agricultural, pastoral and industrial commodities between them. 
The Venetians' edge in the Byzantine provinces, where they were 
the only ones until 1192 to benefit from tax exemption on ali transactions, 
was far more pronounced than in the capital. Even from 1192 until the
Fourth Crusade they maintained a substantial advantage, since the Pisans 
and Genoese had still to pay their reduced kommerkion rate as well as 
maritime dues. The Venetians' wide tax exemptions clearly furthered the 
ramification and intensification of their trade and their handling of domestic 
products within the Empire, whenever they could take full advantage of 
their privileges. Thus, for instance, they exported Peloponnesian oil and 
Cretan cheese to Constantinople, Alexandria and presumably also Venice. 
Since 1071 at the latest they conveyed Theban silks to Venice 
and later to Thessalonica and the Empire's capital66• A number of them 
settled temporarily or permanently in several Byzantine provincial cities, 
namely Dyrrachion, Sparta, Thehes, Corinth, Halmyros, Thessalonica, 
66See David JACOBY, Silk in We.\·/ern Byzantium, pp. 478-479, 493-496, and above, n. 17. 
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Abydos and Rhaidestos, and in sorne of them they had their own churches 
and monasteries67•
Though denied a preferential tax rate in domestic trade until 1192, 
the Pisans were active in Halmyros and presumably involved in its grain 
trade. Sorne of them were settled in the city, where they had two churches, 
attested in the l 150s, in addition to houses, trading facilities and a hospice 
or hospital, destroyed or damaged presumably in 1182, and rural land 
around the city. Before 1182 the Pisans held dwellings and a fondaco in 
Thessalonica, which appear to have served the needs of travelling mer­
chants, rather than those of settlers68 • The extension of their reduced kom­
merkion rate to the provinces in 1192 surely encouraged the Pisans to 
intensify their trade in domestic products. In Modon, in the southwestern 
Peloponnese, three of them acted in 1201 as middlemen between Byzantine 
producers and a Venetian in a large deal in _oil intended for export to Cons­
tantinople69 . The Genoese are documented in the second half of the twelf­
th century in or close to several places, namely Adrianople, Pasequia, 
Abydos, Chrysopolis, Halmyros, Methone or Modon, Colanixi, Avlona, 
Adramyttion, Andros, Chias, Rhodos, Attaleia and Crete70 • Many of these 
localities were for them no more than ports of call on the way to and from 
Constantinople or the Crusader Levant. Genoese trade in them appears to 
have consisted largely in exports by ships sailing to foreign countries, 
rather than in activity on the interna} Byzantine market71• This is not sur­
prising, since from 1169 to 1192 the Genoese suffered in the provinces 
from a serious disadvantage in tax rates and were thus less competitive 
there than their rivals. The extension of their reduced rate to ali types of 
'
75cc Silvano BORSARI, Venezia e Bisando nel XII secolo, pp. 31-106; Ralph-Johanncs 
LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 213-214; IDEM, Die lateinische Kirche in der Romania vor tkm 
vierten Kreuu,ug. Versuch einer BestandaujN.úitM, «Byzantiniachc Zcitachrift», LXXXII 
(1989), pp. 202-206, 209-211. Thcrc alao wu a dependency of S. Nicolo di Lido in Thcasalo­
nica in 1165 according to a later document: Bianca LANFRANCHJ STRINA (ed.), Codex Publico­
rum (Codice del Piovego) 1 (1282-1298) (Fonti per la storia di Vcnczia, aez. 1-Archivi pubbli­
ci), Venczia, 1985, nº 28, p. 207. 
68Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 188-190; Silvano BoRSARI, Pbani a 
Bisanzio, pp. 65-66; Oiuscppe MOLI..ER, Documenti, pp. 71-72. 
69DCV, no. 456. 
70For cvidcncc, see Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handtl und Polilik, indcx, undcr thesc namcs;
for Crctc, 1cc above, n. 17, and for Andros, David JACOBY, Silk in Westem BylJ»ltium, pp. 
460-461. 
71Sec ibid .• pp. 460-461, and abovc, n. 17. 
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transactions since 1192 appears to have enhanced the Genoese supply of the 
Byzantine interna} market, illustrated in 1200 or 1201 by the transportation 
of raw silk and silk fabrics presumably originating in Cyprus to Constanti­
nople72. There is evidence about a single Genoese apparently settled in 
Crete in the 1150s and about a number of them established in Halmyros in 
the early 1160s73 • Yet on the whole the Pisan and Genoese trade and se­
ttlement patterns in the provinces were far more restricted than the Vene­
tian ones74 • This may be partly ascribed to the limited range of their tax 
privileges outside Constantinople until 1192.
In the twelfth century the presence of the ltalian maritime powers 
in the Empire· was either restricted or interrupted at several occasions by 
political circumstances. Lack of continuity reduced or even completely 
. eliminated, each time for several years, the benefits deriving from their 
trade privileges, to the advantage of their rivals. It seems obvious that 
Pisan merchants profited from the almost total halt of Venetian activity in 
Romanía from 1121 to 1126, especial) y in Constantinople75 • Toe expected 
swift development of Genoa's trade in this city after the agreements of
1169 and 1170 may have been among the factors taken into account by
Manuel I when he planned bis coup against the Venetians, which took place
on 12 March 1171. To sorne extent the Pisans and the Genoese apparentl y
succeeded in filling the void left by the Venetians in Constantinople. This
would partly explain the substantial growth of Genoa's trade in the city,
suggested by a comparison of the losses its merchants incurred in 1162 and
1182, respectively76 • 
By contrast, Pisa and Genoa seem to have been less successful in 
the provinces. Toe contraction of Venetian presence for severa! years after 
March 1171 surely enhanced Pisan trade in Halmyros and Thessalonica, yet 
does not appear to have furthered its expansion to other cities. Genoa's 
failure to obtain privileges similar to those conferred on the Venetians since 
1082 or a privileged rate of the kommerkion i.n the provinces severely 
72Scc David JACOBY, Silk in Western Byzantium, pp. 496-497.
"Scc abovc, n. 17, and Ralph-Johanncs LIUE, Handel und Politilc, p. 188, respcctively. 
74This conclusion is also suggestcd by the f ew sources bearing on the Pisana in the Empi-
re' a provinces. 
75On which see Ralph-Johannes LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 368-374, and Silvano 
BoRSARI, Venezia e Bisanzio, pp. 17-19. 
76Ralph-Johannes LIUE, Handel und Politik, pp. 320-321. 
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undercut its prospects of favorable trade developments. The massacre of the 
Latins in Constantinople in 1182, which abruptly interrupted Pisan and 
Genoese activity in the Empire, presumably hastened the return of a num­
ber of Venetians to their former quarter in the city in the following year 
and the expansion of their trade thereafter. The Venetians virtually faced no 
competition from their Italian rivals for about nine years, until the full 
resumption of the Empire's relations with Pisa and Genoa in 1192n . Each 
time the return to the Byzantine market required a rebuilding of trade 
connections and networks. In sorne cases this could easily be achieved, as 
in Thebes where the absence of foreign competition facilitated the task of a 
Venetian a few years only after bis escape from the Empire in 117 l7ª . Yet 
in Constantinople this must have been far more difficult, since competitors 
remaining in the city had ample time to consolidate their position on the 
local market. There were also obstacles in the provinces. Pisa did not 
request the restitution and restoration of its property in Halmyros and 
Thessalonica before 1197, five years after the renewal of its relations with 
the Empire79 , a clear indication that its merchants were slow to regain the 
role they had lost in 1182 in the trade of these cities. 
The review of the commercial and fiscal privileges granted by the 
Byzantine emperors before the Fourth Crusade to Venice, Pisa and Genoa, 
respectively, reveals that the disparity between them was far wider than 
generally assumed. Normative texts, however, do not necessarily reflect 
actual conditions on the ground. Deliberate measures taken by the Byzanti­
ne government, the arbitrary action of its officials, especially in the provin­
ces, and political developments affected in various ways, at times heavily, 
the implementation of the privileges and the benefit deriving from them. 
These factors should be taken into account in any evaluation of Italian trade 
and settlement in Byzantium and the impact these had on the Empire's 
economy. 
77 Ali these events have been trcated abo ve. 
78See above, n. 29. 
79See above, n. 68.
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RÉSUMÉ 
Divers empereurs byzantins octroyerent de 1082 ll 1192 des pri­
vileges étendus aux trois principales puissances maritimes italiennes, Veni• 
se, Pise et Génes. Une nouvelle lecture des clauses commerciales et fiscales 
de ces privileges dans un contexte contemporain et dans un cadre compara­
tif révele des aspects méconnus ou oubliés de leur contenu, suggere de 
nouvelles interprétations et éclaire certains de leurs effets sur le commerce, 
le transport maritime et l 'implantation ital ienne dans l 'Emp\re avant la qua­
trieme croisade. Les écarts entre les privileges respectifs des trois puis­
sances étaient beaucoup plus grands qu'on ne l'admet couramment. L'aRpli­
cation de ces privileges et le profit qui en dérivait ont été affectés de diver­
ses manieres, parfois sensiblement, par les mesures délibérées du gouverne­
ment impérial, les actions arbitraires de ses officiers, en particulier dans les 
provinces, enfin, les développements politiques. 11 faut tenir compte de ces 
facteurs dans toute évaluation du commerce et de l'implantation des ltaliens 
dans l'Empire byzantin et de leur impact sur l'économie de celui-ci. 
SUMMARY 
Between 1082 and· 1192 severa! Byzantine emperors conferre4 
extensive privileges on the three main Italian maritime powers, Venice, 
Pisa and Genoa. A new reading of their commercial and fiscal provisions 
in a contemporary context and in a comparative framework reveals sorne 
misunderstood or overlooked aspects of their content, suggests novel inter­
pretations, and sheds light on sorne of their effects on trade, shipping and 
the Italian settletnent pattern in the Empire before the Fourth Cn,isade. Toe 
disparity between the respective privileges granted to the three maritime 
powers was far wider than generally assumed. Deliberate measures tak:en 
by the Byzantine government, the arbitrary action of its officials, especially 
in the provinces, and political developments affected in various ways� at 
times heavily, tite implementation of these privileges and the benefit deri­
ving from them. These factors should be taken into account in any evalua­
tion of ltalian ttade and settlement in Byzantiu� and the impact these had 
on the Empire's economy. 
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